Acquiring Minds
← Back to all episodes
John Schooler·March 9, 2023

How to Buy and Operate an Appliance Repair Business | John Schooler Interview

Open on YouTube ↗

John Schooler is a first-time buyer who acquired a residential appliance repair company in a mid-size South Carolina city in October 2021, returning to his hometown after five years away. The business was doing roughly $1.2m in revenue with SDE of $200k-$250k, had seven technicians and three office staff, and had been growing at ~15% annually. This episode is a 14-month check-in that covers a turbulent first year: Schooler lost about 20% of revenue overnight when a major warranty/manufacturer contract customer slashed volume, revealing how dangerously concentrated and actually unprofitable many of his third-party contracts were. He also lost technicians during this period due to insufficient attention to employee relationships and retention. His key lesson is to prioritize downside prevention over upside and growth in the early months — running profitability analysis by customer, building deeper relationships with technicians, and de-risking key dependencies before optimizing. By month 14 he had rebuilt the business on a healthier revenue mix with more direct COD work, implemented EOS-style planning and goal-setting, and done a small bolt-on acqui-hire. Despite the hard stretch, he remains bullish on the long-term and is actively looking for additional acquisitions.

Deal facts

sde ebitda
SDE $200k-$250k
revenue
$1.2m
notes
Business had been growing ~15% per year for three years prior to acquisition. Also completed a small bolt-on/acqui-hire a couple months before this recording that added two technicians.

Why this business

Schooler and his wife are both originally from the mid-size South Carolina city where the business is located; buying it was a way to return home, be near family, and lay down roots. He was attracted to the business's steady revenue growth, existing team, and what appeared to be a relatively low owner-dependency model.

What's working

  • Shifting to a healthier revenue mix with more direct (cash-on-delivery) jobs and less reliance on warranty/manufacturer contracts, which were lower-margin and concentration-prone
  • Implementing an EOS-style operating system (meeting cadence, 1-year/3-year/10-year goals) to give the business direction it previously lacked
  • Closer daily check-in process: reviewing every technician's jobs each morning, which took under an hour but provided visibility and coaching opportunities
  • Small bolt-on acqui-hire that added two technicians at a critical time
  • Improving ability to find, hire, and train technicians from scratch, reducing key-person risk

What's hard

  • Lost approximately 20% of revenue overnight when a major warranty/manufacturer customer sharply cut their volume — the single biggest crisis of the first 14 months
  • Warranty and manufacturer contracts carry hidden risks: administrative burden, slow accounts receivable, and the larger the relationship grows the more likely the client is to find a lower-cost alternative
  • Did not analyze per-customer profitability until after losing the major customer; many contracts were actually unprofitable on a per-job basis
  • Did not invest enough time and energy in existing technicians — both positive reinforcement and small practical support (van maintenance, tools) — making it easy for them to leave for competitors
  • Inherited significant 'operational debt': outdated contracts, dozens of phantom email addresses and Google Business profiles, no documented SOPs, no strategic direction
  • Decision-making under high-stakes pressure, fear of embarrassment, and public scrutiny made it hard to take long-term oriented risks and bred risk-aversion
  • Would have focused more on de-risking (downside prevention) from day one rather than upside and operational improvements

Notable quotes

I would have focused Less on how do I get upside and more on how do I prevent downside.
I have paid a great deal of tuition to this point and have learned enough that I actually feel really good right now like we've we can see the light at the end of the tunnel.
Oftentimes their perception of their value is more important than what their actual value is so I felt like we were providing a huge value as a company but I didn't always do a good job of helping them understand and see what they had in our company.
I strongly believe I acquired the best business available at the best terms available at the right time for me and my family best business ever no way going to be a great investment eventually absolutely.
It's hard and like uh maybe this won't work out hard like this really... without those boundaries the negative results can be way worse than any other type of hard.

Tags